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Accurate decisions require knowledge of prior prob-
abilities (e.g., prevalence or base rate), but it is un-
clear how prior probabilities are learned in the
absence of a teacher. We hypothesized that hu-
mans could learn base rates from experience mak-
ing decisions, even without feedback. Participants
made difficult decisions about the direction of dy-
namic random dot motion. Across blocks of 15–42
trials, the base rate favoring left or right varied. Par-
ticipants were not informed of the base rate or
choice accuracy, yet they gradually biased their
choices and thereby increased accuracy and confi-
dence in their decisions. They achieved this by up-
dating knowledge of base rate after each decision,
using a counterfactual representation of confidence
that simulates a neutral prior. The strategy is
consistent with Bayesian updating of belief and
suggests that humans represent both true confi-
dence, which incorporates the evolving belief of
the prior, and counterfactual confidence, which dis-
counts the prior.
INTRODUCTION
Accurate decisionmaking relies on both evidence bearing on the
choice at hand and prior knowledge about the statistical regular-
ities bearing on the possible options. In some instances, we learn
these regularities through education (e.g., disease prevalence
based on decisions of experts), but more often such knowledge
is acquired over time through decisions wemake ourselves. This
poses a problem because without an omniscient teacher, our
decisions can be inaccurate, which limits our ability to update
our beliefs. The problem is compounded because the decisions
we make may be affected by our evolving belief of the statistical
regularities, thereby biasing our decisions, which could in turn
affect how we update our belief about the regularities.
As an example, consider you are working on a production line
determining whether tomatoes arriving one at a time on aNeuron 99, 1083–1097, Septe
This is an open access article undconveyor belt are ripe and ready to ship or unripe and need to
be held back. Some are obviously red and ripe and others are
clearly green and unripe, but there are others on the border
that will be harder to judge. Each crate comes from a different
supplier and will likely have a different proportion of unripe to-
matoes. If you knew each crate’s proportion of unripe tomatoes
(the base rate), it would help you sort the tomatoes. This is an
example in which one is learning a prior (base rate) without a
teacher or confirmation about ground truth.
One possibility is that one would ignore the base rate in this
setting, but that would be unwise when confronted with an
ambiguous tomato. It makes more sense to estimate the base
rate from one’s experience. One could simply use the proportion
of decisions of unripe as the estimate of the base rate. However,
this would give equal weighting to tomatoes judged as clearly
unripe and those on the borderline. An alternative might be to
use a measure of confidence in determining the base rate, but
this invites another challenge. If one uses the base rate to decide
ripeness, this will affect the tally and potentially bias the estimate
of the base rate itself.
This simple example illustrates the complexity of doing infer-
ence in a world in which one is simultaneously learning a model
and applying it. It arises in medical decision making (Medin and
Edelson, 1988; Goldberg, 1970), weather prediction (Knowlton
et al., 1994; Yang and Shadlen, 2007), and other inference prob-
lems that benefit from experience but for which feedback about
ground truth is unavailable on a useful timescale. It has been
shown that people are able to estimate base rates from a
sequence of observations (Phillips and Edwards, 1966; Estes,
1972; Peterson and Beach, 1967) to develop a bias that serves
as prior knowledge in subsequent interactions with the environ-
ment (Anderson and Carpenter, 2006; Manis et al., 1980) and
even use these observations to infer changes in the state of
the environment (Summerfield et al., 2011; Behrens et al.,
2007; Meyniel et al., 2015; Purcell and Kiani, 2016; Nassar
et al., 2010; Rapoport, 1964; Carpenter and Williams, 1995). In
these cases, the observations that inform the prior are clearly
discernible (e.g., target reached/not reached) or are accompa-
nied by explicit feedback. For example, if the sorter were to taste
each tomato, the ground truth could be known, but there would
be no tomatoes shipped.We hypothesized that in the absence of
explicit feedback, decision confidence guides the acquisition
of prior probability and does so in accordance with Bayesianmber 5, 2018 ª 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. 1083
er the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
updating. We build on recent progress in the understanding of
confidence in simple perceptual decisions.
To study the role of confidence in the acquisition of prior prob-
ability, we designed a task in which human participants made a
sequence of binary decisions in the presence of a concealed
base rate that favored one of the alternatives. The decisions
involved judging the direction of motion of a set of randomly
moving dots, which were made without feedback. The base
rate was constant within a block of trials but randomly varied
from one block to another. Crucially, the base rate was not
known to the participant. As the participants made more deci-
sions, the influence of base rate on choice and confidence
increased, which was reflected both in the decision about the di-
rection of motion and in an explicit report about the bias of the
block. A bounded evidence accumulation model explained the
decisions about motion by incorporating an estimate of the
base rate in the accumulation. In turn, a probability distribution
over base rates was updated based on the likelihood that the
motion was rightward or leftward—what we term counterfactual
posterior probability or counterfactual confidence—under the
fictitious supposition that the alternatives were equally likely
(cf. Bernardo, 1979). The model predicted the dynamics of belief
about the direction bias over the block. The findings expose a
role for counterfactual confidence in belief updating, suggesting
that the brain maintains probabilistic representations over deci-
sion hierarchies and timescales: direction over one trial and bias
over many trials. Further, these probabilities are accessible for
explicit reporting.
RESULTS
Three participants were presented with a dynamic display of
random dots of variable duration and had to decide whether
the net direction of motion was rightward or leftward. Within a
block of 15 to 42 trials, one direction of motion (left or right)
was more likely, but which direction was more likely (and by
how much) was unknown to the participant. The difficulty of
the decision was controlled by three factors: strength of motion,
stimulus duration, and bias strength (i.e., base rate). Motion
strength was controlled by the probability (termedmotion coher-
ence [c]) that a dot is displaced in motion as opposed to
randomly. Stimulus duration was sampled from a truncated
exponential distribution (range: [0.1, 0.9] s). Bias strength was
controlled by the probability that the motion direction would be
rightward, termed B, which was selected randomly on each
block from six possible values ranging from 0% to 100% in steps
of 20%. Participants knew the possible values ofB, and that they
were equally likely, but were not told which one applied to the
current block.
Participants made three responses in each trial. They first re-
ported the perceived direction of motion and the confidence
that this decision was correct (Figure 1A, Choice and confidence
report). They then reported whether they considered the block to
have a right or left bias and the confidence in this judgment (Fig-
ure 1A, Belief report). To avoid confusion, we refer to this type of
confidence as ‘‘belief,’’ an estimate of the probability that the
block has a rightward bias (scale 0 to 1). Participants received
no feedback about the accuracy of their decisions during a block1084 Neuron 99, 1083–1097, September 5, 2018of trials. Only after completing a block were they told which
direction was the most probable, the strength of the bias in
this direction (either 60%, 80%, or 100%), and the proportion
of trials in which they responded correctly (Figure 1B).
Figure 1C shows a typical sequence of events and reports that
transpire in a single block in the experiment. The bottom two
rows show the particular sequence of 22 trials, each associated
with motion stimulus of some strength, direction, and duration.
The upper two rows show the corresponding behavioral reports:
direction choice, confidence in the choice, and belief about bias
of the block. In this block, the participant was correct on most of
the trials, with a confidence that was strongly correlatedwithmo-
tion strength. At the beginning of the block, the belief was in the
region of high uncertainty (0.5) and evolved to greater certainty
later in the block. As a glimpse into what we will appreciate in
greater detail later, it can be seen that decisions made with
high confidence are usually followed by larger changes in belief
than decisions made with low confidence. This is evident for tri-
als 9 to 14, which shows a sequence of low-confidence deci-
sions accompanied by subtle changes in belief. The example
provides an intuition for the inference problem the participant
confronts on each short block of trials.
We next describe the main effect of the base rate on the direc-
tion choices, the confidence in these choices and the belief that
the block is biased to the left or right.We then develop a theory to
explain the way the direction decisions inform belief and the way
belief biases those choices. Finally, we use this theory to predict
the time course (evolution) of this belief. We contrast this theory
with alternatives.
Effect of Base Rate on Choice, Confidence, and Belief
Throughout each block, choices were governed by the strength
and direction of randomdotmotion. Figure 2A shows the propor-
tion of rightward choices as a function of stimulus strength,
combining data from all trials sharing the same base rate (color).
When the base rate strongly favored rightward or leftward (1 or 0,
respectively), nearly all of the choices were consistent with the
base rate. At the intermediate base rates, the shift was less pro-
nounced. To capture the effect in a model-free way, we per-
formed logistic regression (solid curves) and estimated the
choice bias (Equation 19, STAR Methods). As shown by the
inset, the subjects clearly internalized the base rate during
the block (Equation 19; p< 108; likelihood ratio test; H0: all
b3 = 0). That is, for the same motion strength, subjects were
more likely to choose the direction consistent with the base
rate of the block. We show combined data from all subjects (in-
dividual subjects are presented in Figure S1). It is clear from
these observations that the subjects acquire knowledge about
the base rate of the block despite the absence of feedback about
whether their decisions were correct. Knowledge of the base
rate should improve the performance on the direction task.
This is clearly supported by Figure 2B, which shows accuracy
as a function of motion strength ðjcjÞ, and groups base rates of
similar strength. We adduce from these observations that partic-
ipants incorporated knowledge of the base rate to bias and
improve their decisions.
Subjects furnished two additional reports—confidence and
belief—which indicate that they formed an impression of the
AB
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Figure 1. Motion Discrimination Task
Each block of 15 to 42 trials was assigned one of six possible base rates: the prior probability that the motion is rightward. In all blocks, the subject discriminated
the direction of random dot motion. No feedback about individual decisions or the base rate was provided until the end of the block.
(A) Sequence of events within a trial. After fixation and a random delay, random dot motion was displayed for 0.1–0.9 s (truncated exponential). Subjects then
positioned a cursor on the left or right arcs to indicate both choice (left versus right) and confidence (100% certainty [top] to guessing [bottom]). After the motion
decision, the subjects reported whether they believed that the block had a rightward or leftward bias (placing the cursor in the left or right half of the line), together
with the confidence in this belief (from unsure at the center to certainty at the extremes).
(B) Example of the feedback display provided at the end of a block.
(C) Example of a sequence of trials within a block. Lower two graphs show variables controlled by the computer: motion strength, direction, and duration. Upper
two graphs show the subject’s reports: direction choice, confidence that the choice was correct, and belief that the base rate favored rightward. An example of
the task is shown in Video S1.prior probability about direction over the course of a block. The
confidence reports associated with each decision were clearly
influenced by the base rate. Figure 2C shows the confidence rat-
ings for correct choices split by the a priori probability that the di-
rection of motion supports the choice that the participant made
(correct choices only). For example, the a priori probability of 0.8
groups together right choices with rightward motion (positive
coherence) in blocks with base rate of 0.8 and left choices withleftward motion (negative coherence) in blocks with base rate
of 0.2. Two features of the confidence ratings stand out. The
subjects were least confident when themotion wasweak (coher-
ence near zero; Equation 20; p< 108, t test, H0 : b1 = 0). More-
over, confidence was higher when the base rate was more infor-
mative (Equation 20; p< 108, t test, H0 : b2 = 0). This is
important because it implies that subjects were not merely
choosing one direction more often (e.g., out of habit) but thatNeuron 99, 1083–1097, September 5, 2018 1085
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Figure 2. Behavior Was Influenced by the
Base Rate
(A) Proportion of trials on which the participants
reported rightward motion as a function of motion
coherence. Data (symbols) are shown separately
for the six levels of base rate, from 0 (leftward was
the correct choice for all trials in the block) to 1 (all
rightward), combining all stimulus durations and
trials in the block. The solid lines are fits of a lo-
gistic regression model (Equation 19). The shift in
the psychometric functions indicate that partici-
pants choices were influenced by the base rate.
Inset shows the magnitude of the bias (b3, Equa-
tion 19) against the actual base rate (error bars are
SE; most are smaller than the points; solid line is
least-squares fit).
(B) Effect of motion strength and base rate on
choice accuracy (same data as in A).The base
rates (color) are combined by degree of informa-
tiveness.
(C) Average confidence reported on correct trials
as a function of the motion coherence. The a priori
probability of correct (color) is an expression of the
base rate relative to the choice that is made (see
text). Error bars represent SE across trials.
(D) Average belief as a function of trial number
within a block for the six different biases. Same
color convention as in (A). A belief of 0 or 1 in-
dicates full certainty that the block was biased to
the left or right, respectively. Shading indicates
SEM. Data are combined across all participants.
The same analyses for each participant are shown
in Figure S1, and the distributions of confidence
and belief for each subject are shown in Figure S2.they incorporated knowledge of the base rate to reduce uncer-
tainty in the decision.
The second report was the belief that the base rate of the block
favored right or left. This ‘‘belief’’ evolved gradually during the
course of the block (Figure 2D). Note that the belief is not an es-
timate of the base rate, as one can be fully confident in a weak
bias, but its evolution was more rapid on average when the
base rate was more informative (Figure 2D, blue curves). We
will attempt to explain the evolution of this bias by developing
a theory of the two-way interaction between bias and choice—
that is, the effect of bias on each decision and the effect of
each decision on the estimate of the base rate of the block.
Hierarchical Bayesian Model
We developed a hierarchical Bayesian model in which subjects
maintain a probability distribution over the base rate, pðBÞ, within
a block and use this knowledge to influence both their choice
and their confidence within a trial. As we will see, the optimal
way to update pðBÞ is to use a counterfactual form of confi-
dence—the probability that a choice rendered on the evidence
would be correct if the base rate were unbiased (i.e., B = 0:5).
We develop this idea in Figure 3 and provide a mathematical
derivation in the STAR Methods.
Figure 3A shows the hierarchyof causes that give rise to a sam-
ple of motion evidence, x. All trials are affected by the base rate,
B, assigned to the block, and B itself is sampled from a uniform
distribution. The bias in the block establishes the prior probability1086 Neuron 99, 1083–1097, September 5, 2018of direction of motion (d = signðcÞ, i.e., R or L) on each trial. The
strength of motion ðjcjÞ and the stimulus duration (T) are deter-
mined probabilistically for all trials (independent of block). The di-
rection and strength of motion specify the stationary stochastic
process comprising samples of evidence, x. We assume that x
is a sample from a Gaussian distribution with mean = kcDt and
variance equal to the sample period ðDtÞ. The parameter k re-
flects the signal to noise of the evidence samples. To make a de-
cision, the brain accumulates samples until either the accumu-
lated evidence (e) reaches a threshold at ±A or the motion
stimulus ends (Figure 3B). The time of this last sample is denoted
te. If leftward and rightwardmotion are equally likely, the decision
about direction should be determined by the sign of e, and the
probability that the motion is rightward is determined by e and
te (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009). The heatmap (Figure 3B, right)
shows the probability that the direction is rightward for all
possible combinations of e and te: puðR j e;teÞ. The example trial
(open circle) would have led to a rightward choicewith probability
0.7 of being correct. The top half of the map thus provides a
lookup table for confidence in a rightward choice. Leftward
choices would arise when the evidence (e) is less than 0, and
the probability that this choice is correct is 1minus the values dis-
played—that is, the top half of themap reflected vertically across
the horizontal green line. These statements about direction
choice, probability of left/right and confidence apply only if left-
ward and rightward motion are equally probable—hence, the
subscript, u (for unbiased), in puðR j e; teÞ. This condition does
AC 
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Figure 3. Bayesian Model
(A) Graphical representation of the hierarchy of causes that give rise to a sample of momentary motion evidence. The shaded areas are observed variables, the
unshaded areas are unobserved variables, and the filled squares are fixed hyperparameters. The block bias is sampled from a uniform distribution over six
possible values (parameterized by kB). B is the block’s base rate, which sets the prior probability over motion direction (d) for the entire block. Themotion strength
ðjcjÞ is sampled on each trial from a uniform distribution over six possible values (parameterized by kc), independent of the block’s base rate. In the experiment, jcj
and d set the probability that a dot plotted at time twill be replotted at time t + 40 ms toward the right or left target. The duration of motion (T) was sampled from a
truncated exponential distribution. In the model, it is assumed that the momentary evidence follows a Gaussian distribution with a fixed variance ðDtÞ and amean
that depends on jcj and d.
(B) Bounded evidence-accumulation model of choice and confidence. The decision is made when the accumulation of momentary evidence (e) reaches a bound
ð±AÞ or the stimulus is curtailed, as in the sample trace. The two color maps show the probability that rightward would be the correct choice based on accu-
mulated evidence e at time te, under different assumptions about the base rate: (left) expectation of the base rate is 0.57 in favor of rightward; (right) based rate is
unbiased (0.5). The dashed green line marks the decision boundary ðpðRÞ = 0:5Þ. We refer to the right map ðpuðR j e; teÞÞ, as the counterfactual posterior
probability of rightward. The left map is formed by multiplying the counterfactual posterior by the expectation of the base rate, given the evidence from the
previous trials ðEði1ÞÞ. The normalization constant assures that the posterior over direction sums to unity.
(C) Belief updating. To update pðBÞ, we multiplied the distribution over base rate from the previous trial (shown on the right) by the expression inside
the parenthesis. This expression is a linear function of B, with a slope given by the counterfactual posterior (center plot). The left panel shows the updated
distribution after the multiplication and normalization. For reference, the horizontal black lines indicate the distribution over base rates from the previous
trial. The normalization constant ensures that pðBÞ sums to unity. The belief that the block is biased in favor of rightward is given by the sum of pðBÞ for B> 0:5
(shading).not occur in our experiment, but the mapping plays a role. We
refer to the mapping on the right as a counterfactual posterior
or counterfactual confidence.
In the experiment, one direction within a block is always more
likely than the other, and this affects the probability that the di-
rection is right (or left) given fe; teg. For example, if the base
rate,B, favors rightward, it might give rise to themap in Figure 3B(left). Notice that the decision criterion (dashed green line) dips to
negative values of e. The mapping to confidence is altered as
well. The same amount of evidence leading to a right choice
(circle) now corresponds to 0.75 probability of being correct.
The calculation supporting this map factors neatly into the
expectation of the base rate multiplied by the counterfactual
posterior—the probability that the direction would be rightwardNeuron 99, 1083–1097, September 5, 2018 1087
if the two directions were equally likely. The expectation of the
base rate is informed by knowledge obtained on the previous
trials in the block, represented by Eði1Þhfe; teg1::i1. In the
example, the expectation of B is 0.57. The confidence
is 0:5730:7 divided by the sum of this term plus ð1 0:57Þ3
ð1 0:7Þ, where the last product is pðd = L jEði1ÞÞpuðL j e; teÞ.
The arithmetic yields approximately 0.75, which is also the pos-
terior probability of right. Put simply, on the current trial, use the
evidence, deliberation time, and the estimate of the base rate
(from previous trials) to make the decision and assign its
confidence.
The remaining question is how knowledge of the base rate is
updated. According to the hierarchical Bayesian model, the sub-
ject begins the block with a prior over the six possible base rates,
p0ðBÞ. The true prior is uniform, but we allow for the possibility
that subjects do not internalize this correctly. Figure 3C shows
how these values are updated. As the graphicalmodel (Figure 3A)
makes clear, inference about B is arbitrated solely by the direc-
tion of motion, d. Key to the update is that the subject should not
use the estimate of direction that they report but the probability
of each direction under a neutral prior ðB = 0:5Þ, in other words,
the counterfactual posterior. This yields the update rule illus-
trated in Figure 3C, which depends on two components that
change across trials: the posterior for rightward (and its comple-
ment for leftward) and the current estimate of the distribution of
B. The use of the posterior can be visualized as a line (Figure 3C,
center) that is then point-wise multiplied by the current pðBÞ (Fig-
ure 3C, right). The six probabilities are scaled to sum to unity
(Figure 3C, left). Note that the updated distribution after one
trial becomes the initial distribution for the next one (i.e.,
pðB jEðiÞÞhpðB j e; te;Eði1ÞÞ). Again, the full derivation of the ex-
pressions is in the STAR Methods.
To appreciate why the Bayesian solution uses the counterfac-
tual posterior to update pðBÞ, consider the following example.
Suppose that the participant has acquired a slight bias for right-
ward and is then presented with a sequence of stimuli of 0%
coherence. The participant will tend to report rightward more
often because the bias exerts a stronger influence when the ev-
idence is weak. Therefore, if true posterior (confidence) is used to
update the bias, the bias would tend to increase until the deci-
sion maker is certain that the block contains a rightward bias,
even though the sensory evidence is ambiguous. As formalized
by the expression in Figure 3C (and in the STAR Methods, Equa-
tions 6, 7, 8, and 9), the correct approach is to update the belief
based on the likelihood that the evidence ðe; teÞ had been ob-
tained in a trial with right or left motion or, equivalently, the
confidence that the subject would have under a neutral (i.e.,
uninformative) prior. In short, the counterfactual posterior cir-
cumvents the problem of a self-reinforcing prior, what might be
thought of as double counting.
This completes both parts of the theory: (1) how to incorporate
one’s estimate of bias into the choice and confidence about di-
rection and (2) how to update the estimate of bias (including the
confidence in this estimate) based on this experience.
Fits of the Bayesian Model to Choice and Confidence
Our main hypothesis is that participants modify their bias ac-
cording to the counterfactual confidence they have in their deci-1088 Neuron 99, 1083–1097, September 5, 2018sion. To test this hypothesis, we use the Bayesian model
described in the previous section to fit each subject’s choices
and confidence reports. We compared thismodel to two alterna-
tive models, one in which participants update their bias based
only on the frequency of left and right choices (i.e., ignoring con-
fidence) and another in which participants used confidence
(instead of its counterfactual) to update the bias. After comparing
the goodness of fit of the three models for the motion direction
reports, we use the best-fitting model to predict—without addi-
tional degrees of freedom—the explicit reports of the belief that
were not used in the model fitting.
We used the sequence of stimuli (motion coherence and dura-
tion) on each trial to maximize the likelihood of the choice (left or
right) and confidence (high or low) on each trial (see STAR
Methods). The model constructs a hidden ‘‘latent’’ representa-
tion of the subject’s knowledge of the base rate, pðBÞ, as it
evolves with each trial. As shown in Figure 4A, subjects’ choice
accuracy was explained by the Bayesian model. The points,
which are identical to those in Figure 2B, combine data over
the entire block, for both directions, and for all stimulus dura-
tions. The more informative the base rate, the more it can be
relied upon to improve accuracy. The model quantitatively
explains the degree to which the base rate was learned and
incorporated by the participants (see Figure S3 for individual
subjects). Figure 4B shows the same accuracy data but as a
function of viewing duration for each motion strength. Here the
data combine all base rates. Note that accuracy improves as a
function of viewing duration for all informative (>0%) coherences
(Equation 21; p< 108, t test, H0 : b2 = 0). This improvement is
consistent with bounded accumulation of noisy evidence, where
the bound curtails improvement at longer viewing durations,
consistent with previous studies (Kiani et al., 2008; Zylberberg
et al., 2012). These two graphs are informative cross sections
of a rich dataset.
Knowledge of the base rate, B, was acquired gradually during
each block of trials. Figure 4C demonstrates the time course of
the changes in choice accuracy. We used logistic regression to
estimate the leverage of base rate on accuracy for each trial in
a block (STAR Methods, Equation 21). The ordinate shows the
leverage of B on accuracy after accounting for motion strength.
It supports the model-free assertion that bias-dependent accu-
racy is learned over the course of the block (Equation 21;
p< 108, likelihood ratio test, H0: all b6 = 0), and it shows that
this rate is consistent with expectations of the Bayesian model
(gray shading).
The model was also fit to explain the subject’s confidence in
the direction report. For each subject, we tried to explain the
probability that their confidence was high or low, relative to a cri-
terion setting (see STAR Methods). The model produces an esti-
mate of confidence that depends on the stimulus (strength and
duration), the subject’s choice, and the model’s current estimate
of the base rate (Figure 3C). It did not incorporate the subject’s
belief reports. The lower row of Figure 4 shows the confidence
fits in a way that parallels the accuracy analyses. The trial group-
ings are the same as in the corresponding accuracy plots (upper
row), with one exception. The block base rate (Figure 4D) are ex-
pressed as the a priori probability that the direction of motion
supports the choice that the participant made (correct choices
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Figure 4. Fits of the Bayesian Model to Choice and Confidence
(A) Proportion of correct responses as a function of motion strength, split by the base rate of the block (same data as Figure 2B). Solid lines are model fits.
(B) Choice accuracy as a function of duration of the motion stimulus, split by motion strength. Symbols are mean ± SE, and solid lines are model fits. Points are
quantiles (157 trials per point).
(C) The influence of the base rate on accuracy increasedwith trial number within blocks. Symbols are the fitted coefficients (±SE) from logistic regression fits to the
data (b6, Equation 21). The shaded area is the SE estimated from the model (see STAR Methods).
(D) Proportion of high-confidence responses on correct trials as a function of motion and base rate. The colors represent different levels of bias relative to the
chosen direction (similar to Figure 2B). Symbols are mean ± SE across trials. Solid lines are model fits. (Figure S3 shows the error trials.)
(E) Proportion of high-confidence responses as a function of the duration of the motion stimulus. Correct trials only. Same grouping of trials as in (B).
(F) The influence of the base rate on proportion of high-confidence responses increased with trial number within blocks. Symbols are the fitted coefficients (±SE)
from logistic regression fits to the data (b9, Equation 22). The shaded area is the SE estimated from the model (see STAR Methods). See Figure S3 for single-
participant data.only), as in Figure 2C. Themodel captures the important features
of the data. Larger a priori probability of a correct choice
increased confidence, and this effect was more apparent at
the weaker motion strengths (Figure 4D). Confidence also varies
as a function of stimulus motion strength and duration (Fig-
ure 4E). There is somemismatch with the model at 12.8% coher-
ence (Figure 4D), especially for the 300–600 ms durations
(Figure 4E). The effects build up gradually as a function of trial
number in the block (Figure 4F), showing that this rate is consis-
tent with expectations of the Bayesian model (gray shading).
We compared the Bayesian model against two alternatives,
which differ in the way knowledge of the base rates is updated
across trials. As indicated in Figure 3C, a Bayesian observer
will update her knowledge about the base rate after each trial
using the expression,
p

B j e; te;Eði1Þ

fðBnr + ð1 BÞnlÞp

B jEði1Þ Equation 1
where nr = 1 nl is equal to the counterfactual posterior for right-
ward motion, puðR j e; teÞ. In the first alternative, the participant
updates pðBÞ based on the frequency of left and right choices,
weighting all choices equally (i.e., ignoring confidence). This is
implemented by making the evidence nr equal to 1 for right
choices and 0 for left. We refer to this model as the Choice-
onlymodel. In the second alternativemodel, the evidence for up-dating the bias is the confidence that the participant reports in
each trial rather than the counterfactual confidence that would
have been reported under a neutral prior. To model this, we
made nr equal to the confidence that the subjects report when
they chose rightward, thus equal to pðR j e; te; Eði1ÞÞ, and to
one minus confidence when subjects chose left. We refer to
this model as the Choice-confidence model. As mentioned
earlier, this model is suboptimal because the evidence for updat-
ing the bias is corrupted by the bias itself.
A model comparison showed that the Bayesian model is the
one that best fit the data for all participants (combining across
participants, the difference in log likelihood was 70 and 75 for
the Choice-only and Choice-confidence models relative to the
Bayesian model; see Table S1 for data from individual partici-
pants). The three models have the same number of parameters
(Table S2), and thus, the same result is obtained with measures
that penalize the goodness of fit by the number of free parame-
ters (e.g., the BIC or AIC). The model comparison supports the
interpretation that participants used a graded measure of cer-
tainty in the decision to update their beliefs about block bias.
The support for the Bayesian model is particularly strong when
we combine the likelihoods over the different participants.
Note that the support for the Bayesian model derives from a
model comparison that uses only the choices and the confi-
dence in the motion direction decision.Neuron 99, 1083–1097, September 5, 2018 1089
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Figure 5. Descriptive Rendering of the Rule to Update Knowledge of the Base Rate
The Bayesian model and its alternatives can be characterized by the way they update pðBÞ based on the choice-confidence and the expectation of the base rate,
expressed relative to the choice taken (E½Bdhp½d jEði1Þ, similar to a priori probability correct). The strength of the update is parameterized by nd .
(A) For the Choice-only model, nd is always equal to 1.
(B) For the Choice-confidence model, nd only depends on the reported confidence.
(C) For the Bayesian model, nd is the counterfactual confidence, which is a function of both reported confidence and pðd jEði1ÞÞ.
(D) For the Empirical model, we used a flexible mapping (Equation 16) of confidence and pðd jEði1ÞÞ to nd that best fit the data.The Evidence for Belief Updating: An Empirical
Approach
The three models represent distinct alternatives for updating:
Choice-only, Choice-confidence (i.e., choice weighted by con-
fidence), and Bayesian. The model comparison, based on fits
to choice and confidence, provides support for the Bayesian
model, but the exercise fails to capture the qualitative differ-
ences in these models. Here we pursue a more general
approach (Figure 5). The critical issue differentiating these
models is the way they update the knowledge of the base
rate, pðBÞ. In Equation 1, this is captured by the term nd that
multiplies the six possible values of the base rate (where
d stands for the chosen direction; i.e., nd = nr or nl). We can
view each of the three alternatives as different instantiations
of nd, which depends on two quantities: (1) the confidence
that choice is correct, pðd j e; te;Eði1ÞÞ, and (2) the expectation
about the direction of motion before seeing the stimulus pre-
sented on the trial, pðd jEði1ÞÞ. These two quantities are the
abscissa and ordinate of the graphs in Figure 5. The color de-
picts the updating term nd as specified by the three models
(Figures 5A–5C) or fit to the data using an arbitrary combination
of the two terms, which we refer to as an ‘‘Empirical model’’
(Figure 5D). In the Choice-only model (Figure 5A), nd is a con-
stant, implying that the update depends only on the choice.
In the Choice-confidence model (Figure 5B), nd depends only
on the confidence. In the Bayesian model (Figure 5C), nd is
the counterfactual confidence, which manifests as an interac-
tion between confidence and the expectation of the base
rate. Intuitively, this is because the confidence is an expression
of the posterior probability, whose relationship to the counter-
factual posterior requires removal of the prior—that is, the
expectation of the base rate. We next derive an empirical map-
ping that best accounts for the data.
To produce Figure 5D, we used a flexible five-parameter map-
ping (Equation 16) to relate nd to the two quantities represented
on the abscissa and ordinate. Unlike Figures 5A–5C, in which nd
is derived from theory, in Figure 5D, nd is obtained by fitting the
data, as in Figure 4, by maximizing the likelihood of the choice1090 Neuron 99, 1083–1097, September 5, 2018and confidence data. The key difference is now we incorporate
additional terms to specify nd (see STARMethods). The resulting
empirical map (Figure 5D) resembles the Bayesian map in Fig-
ure 5C. For a fixed level of confidence, knowledge of the base
rate is affected more strongly when the prior expectation of the
decision direction is less supportive of the choice (vertical
gradient). For example, when this expectation opposes the
chosen direction (i.e., lower half of the map), the update is stron-
ger. Intuitively, this is because the reported confidence is a func-
tion of both the stimulus strength and the prior knowledge.
Therefore, if the prior opposes the choice (expectation < 0:5),
then the confidence that the subject would have under a neutral
prior (expectation = 0:5) must be greater than the one reported.
The exercise complements the conclusions drawn from model
comparison by adopting a more open-ended answer to the
question of what combination of confidence and prior expecta-
tion best supports the updating of pðBÞ consistent with choice.
The answer is that confidence is not sufficient but is adjusted
by prior expectation in a way that emulates the conversion to
counterfactual confidence.
We also explored the possibility that our participants used a
combination of the Bayesian and Choice-confidence models to
update their knowledge about the base rate. To test this alter-
native, we fit a new model, similar to the Empirical model
presented in Figure 5 but in which nr was set equal to
bpuðR j e; teÞ + ð1 bÞpðR j e; te; Eði1ÞÞ. If b is one, the model
is identical to the Bayesian model, and if b is zero, it is identical
to the Choice-confidence model. For intermediate values of b,
the model updates its knowledge of the base rate using a com-
bination of the values of nr used by both models. We fit the
model to data just as for the Bayesian and Choice-confidence
models, but with b as an additional free parameter. For every
participant, we found that b was greater than 0.9994. This pro-
vides additional support for the Bayesian model over the
Choice-confidence model (and over a combination of the
two). Having provided further support for the Bayesian model
(counterfactual confidence), we now use this model to predict
the subjects’ belief reports.
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Figure 6. The Bayesian Model Predicts Belief Reports
(A) Evolution of beliefs for six example blocks. The colored thick lines are the
data. The thin lines represent predictions from ten simulations of the Bayesian
model using the same sequence of trials (motion strength, duration, and di-
rection) as seen by the subjects. They differ because the evidence is sampled
randomly on each trial ðfe; tegÞ, which may lead to differences in choice and
confidence.
(B) Evolution of belief as a function of the trial number within the block. Lines
are predictions of the model, and the shaded areas show the SE of the data
(as in Figure 2D).
(C) Predicted belief for the last trial of each block plotted against the
data from the same block. The colored circles identify the six blocks shown
in (A). The predictions (abcissa) are from one simulation of the full
experiment; the average R2 indicated in the panel is an average over 200
simulations.
(D) Same comparison as in (C) but averaged by actual base rate. Error bars are
SE (usually smaller than the data points); dashed line is identity. See also
Figures S4 and S5.Belief Predictions from Fits to Choice and Confidence
To establish fits of the Bayesian model on the basis of each
subject’s choices and confidence, we relied on an estimate
of the base rate (E½B, Figure 3B) derived from the distribution,
pðBÞ. This distribution was updated in accordance with
Bayesian theory using the previous decision and counterfac-
tual confidence. Although subjects reported their belief that
the block was biased to the right or left, we did not use
these reports to fit the model. Thus, we can now ask how
well the model predicted these reports. According to the
model, the belief that the base rate favors rightward oughtto correspond to the sum of pðBÞ for values of B greater
than 0.5 (Figure 3C),
beliefh
X
B> 0:5
pðBÞ Equation 2
Figure 6A shows the predictions and data for the belief that the
block has a rightward bias for a few individual blocks. Each panel
shows data from one randomly chosen block (colored trace). The
gray lines show the belief produced from simulations of the
block, using the same stimuli in the same order of the block.
The simulated trials lead to different states of the accumulated
noisy evidence, hence different choices and confidence, which
in turn affect the evolution of pðBÞ. Each gray line shows the evo-
lution of belief for a different run of themodel. For both themodel
and the participants, the belief after the first decision is close
to ½. As more decisions are made, the belief tends to become
more certain.
This is seenmore clearly when we average the belief for the six
different levels of base rate (Figure 2D), redrawn here as colored
areas showing the SEM across trials (Figure 6B). The thin lines in
Figure 6B are the predicted time course from the Bayesian
model. Subjects’ belief reports initially lagged the predictions,
but by trial 20, the data and predictions are almost perfectly
aligned. This agreement was evident across the individual
blocks. To quantify this, we compared the reported belief on
the last trial of each block to the predicted belief on these trials
(e.g., the average of the termination of the model simulation in
Figure 6A). The scatterplot (Figure 6C) displays this comparison
for all 485 blocks (the examples in Figure 6A are identified by co-
lor). Moreover, the average belief on the last trial of each block
was almost identical to the predictions of the Bayesian model
when grouped by base rate (Figure 6D). The agreement between
data and predictions is remarkable considering that the predic-
tions were based only on the fits of the model to the direction
choice and confidence.
While the belief predictions on Figure 6 were produced by the
Bayesian model, similar predictions were made by the Choice-
confidence model and even by the Choice-only model (Fig-
ure S4). This implies that the agreement between model and
data in Figure 6 cannot be taken as support for the Bayesian
model. To compare the accuracy of the predictions made by
the different models, each model was simulated 200 times on
the full experiment, and, for each simulation, we compute the
mean squared error (MSE) between model and data using the
belief at the end of each block. Figure 7 shows theMSE compar-
isons between the Bayesian and the other two models. Each
point represents a pair of simulations using the identical
sequence of motion stimuli. The beliefs predicted by the
Bayesian model were consistently better than those of the
Choice-confidence (Figure 7, left; p< 108, paired t test) and
the Choice-only (Figure 7, right; p< 108, paired t test) models,
providing additional support for the Bayesian model. We also
corroborated the prediction that stronger motion, associated
with higher confidence on average, should lead to a larger
change in the belief that the block is biased to the right or left
(Figure S5). The analysis does not discriminate between the
Bayesian and the Choice-confidence models, but it is inconsis-
tent with the Choice-only model.Neuron 99, 1083–1097, September 5, 2018 1091
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Figure 7. Comparison of Model Predictions
of Belief at End of Block
For 200 simulations of the full experiment for each of
the three models, we predicted the belief at the end
of each block and computed the mean squared
error between the predictions and the data. Each
point represents a pair of models that were simu-
lated with the same sequence of stimuli: (left)
Bayesian model versus Choice-confidence model;
(right) Bayesian model versus Choice-only model.
The histogram shows the distribution of the differ-
ence in MSE across the 200 simulations. The pre-
diction errors were consistently smaller for the
Bayesian model.One clear mismatch between predicted and observed belief
settings is apparent in the early trials of the block, where there
is a lag in the belief reports relative to the predictions of the
Bayesian model (Figures 6B and S4). We hypothesized that
this lag might arise if participants communicate each change
of belief gradually over several trials, thus blurring the reports.
To evaluate this proposal, we included a single additional param-
eter in our model, the time constant a over which the belief up-
date affects the report (Figure 8A). This simple modification
reduced the discrepancy between model and data (Figure 8B),
and it explains several other aspects of the belief reports, such
as their distribution (Figure 8C; incorporating the lag reduced
the MSE between the reported belief and the model prediction
by 2%, 28%, and 22% for the three subjects, respectively;
p< 0:005 for all subjects). Further, in the Bayesian model, for tri-
als with 0%motion strength, the change of belief should be near
zero on average, because counterfactual confidence is equally
likely to support leftward or rightward motion. On the contrary,
subjects tended to update their beliefs in the direction of the pre-
viously held biases (Figure 8D). This effect was reproduced in
simulations of the model with lag. The intuition is simple: when
the bias is rightward (i.e., belief > ½ ), the changes of belief
from previous trials contribute to the change in belief on the cur-
rent trial even when the coherence is 0%.
The carryover effects of one trial to the next can be observed
more directly by splitting the change in belief by the motion
strength of the previous trial, when themotion strength in the cur-
rent trial is 0%. Consistent with our interpretation, the change in
belief at 0% coherence is informed by the coherence of the pre-
vious trial, an effect that is inconsistent with both the Bayesian
and the Choice-confidence models without lag (Figures 8E and
S8). Further, the Bayesian model predicts that for trials on which
the counterfactual confidence is ½, there should be a negligible
change in belief regardless of the participant’s choice (Figure 8F,
right). Instead, the data show an effect of choice even when the
counterfactual confidence (inferred from the model) is ½ (Fig-
ure 8F, left). A similar dissociation by choice is observed in the
Bayesian model with lag (Figure 8F, center). The chosen direc-
tion is informative about the bias of the block and thus about
the direction of the change in belief that is carried over from pre-
vious trials. Note that our implementation of lag retains consis-
tency with the Bayesian model because the internal estimate
of pðBÞ is updated immediately to affect the next trial (via E½B).1092 Neuron 99, 1083–1097, September 5, 2018It is just the position of the computer mouse used to express
the belief that is smeared over a few trials. We verified this asser-
tion by evaluating an alternative model in which the lag directly
affects the update of pðBÞ (Equation 18) and therefore also
choice and confidence. The best fit was a lag of zero for all sub-
jects. This was true for the Choice-only and Choice-confidence
models too and therefore does not affect the model comparison.
These results indicate that the lag is specific to the communica-
tion of belief rather than the update of pðBÞ itself.
We have assumed that subjects can both report their belief
that the block is biased ðpðB> 0:5ÞÞ and represent the underlying
magnitude of the base rate ðE½BÞ. To confirm this, we analyzed
the choices on 0% coherence trials in which they were close to
certain about the bias of the block (>0:95 or <0:05 on the previ-
ous trial). If the subject’s representation of base rate matches
that of the block, then on these trials with little net motion, the
subject should report more frequently in the direction of bias
when the base rate is more informative despite the belief being
equally strong. Indeed, subjects weremore likely to report the di-
rection of the belief when the base rate wasmore extreme (Equa-
tion 24; p< 106, t test, H0 : b1 = 0). This analysis presents
model-free evidence that participants represent not only the
quantity that they are asked to report (belief) but also a measure
of the magnitude of the base rate.
DISCUSSION
Base rate, prevalence, and prior probability distribution are ex-
amples of statistical regularities that ought to shape our deci-
sions. A decision maker must learn these regularities from
sources, such as census or epidemiological research, or through
learning. We have shown that decision makers can infer such
regularities from their own decisions and use the evolving knowl-
edge of the base rate—its prior probability distribution—to make
better decisions, even during the learning process itself.
Remarkably, they did this without feedback about the validity
of their decisions, which were, for themost part, difficult. Indeed,
more than half of the decisions were about weak motion that
would, under neutral priors, give rise to correct choices on less
than 75% of trials—that is, just better than guessing. Such diffi-
cult trials are the very ones that benefit themost from knowledge
of the base rate. We showed that subjects incorporated an
evolving estimate of base rate into these decisions and their
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Figure 8. A Lag in the Belief Reports
(A) Sketch of the model with lagging belief reports. fi
is the reported belief on trial i, and bi is the belief that
would have been reported under the Bayesian
model. If the time constant of the belief (a) is zero,
the reports are equal to those of the Bayesian
model; if it is one, the belief is always ½.
(B) Evolution of belief as a function of the trial
number within the block. Lines are predictions of the
model with lag. The shaded areas show the SE of
the data.
(C) Distributions of belief reports from the partici-
pants (histogram), and the Bayesian model with and
without lag. The Bayesian model cannot explain the
large number of trials with belief near ½, but the
mismatch is reduced with the addition of the lag.
(D) Change in belief from one trial to the next, as a
function of the current belief. The analysis only in-
cludes trials with 0% motion strength. Data were
binned into 20 percentile groups. For both model
with lag (dashed line) and data (points), beliefs are,
on average, updated in the direction of the previ-
ously held belief. Error bars indicate SE.
(E) As (D), but splitting trials by the sign of the motion
coherence on the previous trial. Data were binned
into five percentile groups. The change in belief is
influenced by the direction of motion of the previous
trial. The effect is replicatedby themodelwith lag, but
not by the Bayesian model. Error bars indicate SE.
(F) Change in belief as a function of the counter-
factual confidence inferred from the model. Data
are split by choice. Lines are moving averages of
100 trials. The Bayesian model predicts no change
in belief if the counterfactual confidence is ½. In
contrast, changes in belief were informed by choice
even when the counterfactual confidence was ½
(left), an effect that is also seen in the model with lag
(middle). Figure S8 shows the same analyses for the
Choice-confidence model.confidence while at the same time exploiting the decision to up-
date knowledge of the base rate.
We observed that the influence of the base rate on our three
behavioral measures—decision, confidence, and belief—devel-
oped gradually during the block. This was evident in the two
ways by which we evaluated the learning of the base rates:
implicitly, through their influence on decision and confidence,
and explicitly, through the belief report—the confidence that
the base rate favors rightward. Both methods gave consistent
results. Indeed, we were able to fit a model to the decision and
confidence reports and predict how the belief evolved during
the block. This suggests that the influence of bias on the implicit
and explicit reports is mediated by a common estimate, which in
our model is represented by a probability distribution of possible
base rates that is updated from one decision to the next. It alsoNeurshows that people have introspective ac-
cess to quantities that are used in the com-
putations of a hierarchical probabilistic
model, and therefore, subjective reports
can be used to constrain models of deci-
sion making (Kang et al., 2017).A theoretical analysis showed that the evidence for updating
knowledge about the base rate is a ‘‘counterfactual’’ form of con-
fidence, understood as the confidence that the subjects would
have if left and right were equally likely (i.e., a neutral prior) and
not the confidence that the subjects report. The intuition for
this distinction is simple: the evidence used to modify an hypoth-
esis should not be altered by the decision maker’s previous
belief about the veracity of the hypothesis. We compared the
optimal solution to two suboptimal alternatives that differ in the
information used to update belief: choice-only and choice-confi-
dence. These alternatives achieve explanations of subjects’
evolving belief that differ only subtly from the Bayesian counter-
factual confidence solution, at least by eye (Figure S4, but see
Figure 7), but a formal model comparison supports the conclu-
sion that subjects used counterfactual confidence to updateon 99, 1083–1097, September 5, 2018 1093
their bias. This conclusion was confirmed with a separate model
in which we directly search over the space of transformations
that map confidence and bias strength on the evidence that is
used to update their knowledge of the base rate (Figure 5). The
use of a counterfactual confidence for updating the bias implies
the existence of different probabilistic quantities associated with
the same state of accumulated evidence, a distinction that may
be related to the one between confidence and visibility (Rausch
and Zehetleitner, 2016).
The concept of a counterfactual posterior, and the related
counterfactual confidence, demands some justification. Mathe-
matically, the counterfactual posterior is simply the likelihood.
Just because we factor the update rule to highlight this quantity
does not automatically imply that the brain uses it. We believe
that such a representation is neurophysiologically plausible
because likelihoods are known to be represented in the brain
(Yang and Shadlen, 2007; Kira et al., 2015) and can arise from
simple sum and differences of neural firing rates (Gold and Shad-
len, 2001; Shadlen et al., 2006; Ma et al., 2006). Moreover, it is
obvious that a representation of counterfactual confidence is
essential in many types of real-world decisions. For example, if
instead of manipulating the prior probability of right and left,
we had altered the reward such that all correct rightward choices
were rewarded more than leftward, it would induce a rightward
bias (Ulehla, 1966; Rorie et al., 2010). In this circumstance, it
would be sensible to express both a confidence that we made
the better choice and a confidence that the motion was to the
right. For example, when confronted with weak motion, we
would be confident that a rightward choice was best while simul-
taneously less confident that the net direction was to the right.
The dual representation of confidence is intuitive when value in-
duces a bias but less so when prior probability (base rate) does
so, because the prior is about the motion itself. What we show
here is that such a dual representation of confidence in our deci-
sion and counterfactual confidence allows us to both respond as
accurately as possible and learn about the statistical regularities
of the environment.
Our Bayesian model incorporates at least one element of sub-
optimality. Although subjects were informed that the distribution
over base rates was discrete and uniform, we allowed for the
possibility that the prior assumed by the subjects was not verid-
ical. We approximated this initial prior, p0ðBÞ, with two parame-
ters, which were estimated in the fits to the direction choice and
confidence (see STAR Methods). All three subjects appear to
have assigned a greater initial probability to base rates away
from the extremes (Figure S6). This might imply that subjects
were unable to override a predisposition that sequences of
random samples tend to be only weakly biased, on average—
an arguably sensible prior over prior probability distributions—
despite direct verbal instruction. The deviation from optimality
was only marginally detrimental to performance. For example,
the proportion of correct responses was 85.01% in the data
and 84.93% in simulations of the Bayesian model, whereas we
estimate that the uniform prior would yield 87.43% correct. It
could be argued that the lag in the belief reports also represents
a suboptimal behavior. This would certainly be the case if the lag
affected actual belief (i.e., pðBÞ), but that was not the case.More-
over, since participants only received feedback about the true1094 Neuron 99, 1083–1097, September 5, 2018base rate at the end of the block, there was no cost associated
with delaying the report, and at the end of the block, the belief
was in agreement with theory.
The lag does have an unfortunate ramification, as it limits our
ability to test some qualitative predictions of the Bayesianmodel.
For example, we would predict that the change in belief on trials
with 0% coherence should average to zero regardless of the
currently held belief. However, such an analysis is not possible
because of the lag: the change in belief communicated by the
subject was affected by changes in belief from previous trials.
It would be desirable to eliminate this lag in future investigations.
Preliminary investigations lead us to believe that this might be
achieved using a different method to report belief using move-
ments for which lagging does not reduce motor cost (e.g., eye
movements).
Our task represents an attempt to extend our understanding of
the neurobiology of simple decisions to tasks that have hierarchi-
cal structure. One tempting idea is that the same process of
evidence accumulation that allows one tomake a simple percep-
tual decision extends to higher levels and longer timescales (Kim
et al., 2017; Purcell and Kiani, 2016; Glaze et al., 2015; Braun
et al., 2018). In the abstract, this is true because both are effec-
tively Bayesian, but this insight deserves further scrutiny. The
idea that the brain updates pðBÞ in the same way that it updates
a decision variable implies the accumulation of a scalar quantity
across multiple trials. This strategy would furnish an optimal
estimate of the base rate if the decision maker were to receive
unambiguous feedback about the true direction on each trial
(Laplace, 1814). However, when the decisions vary in difficulty
(and thus in confidence), there is no scalar quantity that the sub-
jects can accumulate from one trial to the next that preserves all
information about pðBÞ. To provide an intuition, suppose the sub-
ject used counterfactual confidence, signed by choice, to up-
date pðBÞ, and consider two scenarios. (1) A decision maker
chooses rightward on the first trial and leftward on the second,
both decisions made with full confidence. (2) The same choices
ensue but with very low levels of confidence. In both scenarios,
the running tally would be zero, but in the first, the uncertainty
should be reduced more than in the second. This is because in
the first scenario, it is known that the block has both right and
left stimuli and therefore extreme biases are unlikely. This knowl-
edge is captured by the normative propagation of pðBÞ but not by
any scalar accumulation strategy. Of course, the brain might
approximate pðBÞ using a few parameters, such as a Beta distri-
bution (Ma, 2012).
In models of bounded evidence accumulation, the prior is
often incorporated as a static shift in the starting point of the
accumulation (e.g., Carpenter and Williams, 1995; Mulder
et al., 2012). In our task, however, this would be suboptimal,
because as time elapses, the same level of accumulated evi-
dence is a less reliable marker of decision accuracy, and thus
the bias should be dynamic (Hanks et al., 2011; Huang et al.,
2012; Drugowitsch et al., 2012). Indeed, Hanks et al. showed
that monkeys and humans are sensitive to the time dependence
of the influence of the prior when making decisions similar to
ours. In their implementation, a dynamic bias signal gradually
displaces the DV toward a decision bound (the one representing
the most likely choice) and away from the other. This
approximation was motivated by observations in the neural re-
cordings and reaction times. Here we pursued a normative
approach and thus replaced this approximation with a represen-
tation of likelihood and its mapping, induced by the prior, to the
dynamic posterior probability that motion is to the right or left
(e.g., Figure 3B).
The present study complements several recent studies which
have addressed the manner in which a decision maker can
sense a change in the statistical structure of the environment
(Summerfield et al., 2011; Behrens et al., 2007; Norton et al.,
2017; Nassar et al., 2010; Yu and Cohen, 2008; Anderson
and Carpenter, 2006), similar to the change in base rate that
occurs (with probability 5/6) at the beginning of each block in
our experiment. Whereas we provided explicit instruction that
the block changed and no feedback about the decisions
made during the block, these complementary studies provide
no explicit feedback that the environment has changed.
Instead, they provide feedback about the success or failure
of the decisions made in the new environment (cf. Kim et al.,
2017). The common theme is that statistical inference occurs
over two temporal scales, one concerning individual decisions
and the other the statistical regularities about the environment
in which these decisions are undertaken. The key contribution
of the present study is to show that counterfactual confidence,
derived from the decision at hand, informs the evolving knowl-
edge of statistical regularities over the longer timescale of many
decisions. In the tomato problem introduced earlier, the sorter
would apply whatever knowledge of the base rate she has to
each tomato. It would tend to influence the borderline cases
most. With each decision, knowledge of the proportion of
ripe and unripe would be updated using confidence in the to-
mato itself, stripped as it were, from the influence of base
rate, as if imagining a box with equal proportions of ripe and
unripe fruit. The sorter might use this evolving knowledge to
tell a co-worker that a crate seems to contain mostly unripe
fruit and the degree to which she believes this to be true.
She could also report her estimate of the proportion itself,
but as in our experiment, that will also be evident in the deci-
sion about the next sample and the confidence that it has
been sorted correctly.
Without immediate feedback from the world, confidence is
all we know about the veridicality of our assertions. Recent
progress in understanding the mechanisms for deciding and
assigning a degree of confidence to isolated decisions has
set the stage to study the role of confidence in more complex
tasks, especially those that involve multiple steps (Gold and
Stocker, 2017; Zylberberg et al., 2011). It has been suggested
that confidence plays a key role in assigning blame to different
sources of evidence after an error (Purcell and Kiani, 2016;
McGuire et al., 2014), controlling how much effort and time
to invest in a decision that depends on the success of a
previous decision (van den Berg et al., 2016), combining deci-
sions in a hierarchy to maximize reward (Lorteije et al., 2015),
and guiding perceptual learning in the absence of feedback
(Guggenmos et al., 2016). Confidence may also play a role
in combining individual opinions with those of a group
according to their reliabilities (De Martino et al., 2017;
Park et al., 2017; Bahrami et al., 2010). Our work adds tothese studies by showing that confidence mediates the
bidirectional process by which decisions both inform
and are informed by a dynamic estimate of a base rate.
It does so by drawing implicitly on counterfactual knowl-
edge about confidence associated with a setting that is inap-
plicable to the decision at hand. Counterfactual reasoning is
thought to play a role in slow, deliberative decision making,
where it relies on narrative devices or playing through imag-
ined scenarios. It is intriguing to consider that a more
automatic form of counterfactual reasoning, such as we
have demonstrated here, arises in a ‘‘thinking fast’’ (Kahne-
man, 2011) mode, where it conforms to normative Bayesian
principles.
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EXPERIMENTAL MODEL AND SUBJECT DETAILS
Three human participants (2 male, 1 female; age 24-35) gave informed consent and participated in the experiment. The experimental
protocol was approved by the local ethics committee (Institutional Review Board of Columbia University Medical Center). All partic-
ipants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and were naive about the purpose of the study. Owing to sample size, no gender
specific analyses were performed.
METHOD DETAILS
Behavioral Task
Stimuli were displayed on a CRT monitor (ViewSonic, PF790) with a refresh rate of 75 Hz. A head and chin rest ensured that the dis-
tance between the participants eyes and the monitor’s screen was 48 cm. We tracked the position of the eye with an Eyelink 1000
eye-tracker.
Subjects performed a motion direction discrimination task in blocks of trials. They were given no information about their
performance until the end of each block. The number of trials in each block was sampled from a truncated geometric distribution
(p = 1/15) with a minimum of 15 trials and a maximum of 42 trials. Within each block of trials, one of the motion directions (leftward
or rightward) was more probable than the other. The base rate of each block was sampled with equal probability from the set
B˛½0;0:2;0:4;0:6;0:8;1, where B indicates the proportion of rightward directions. That is, given a block of ntr trials, the number of
trials with rightward motion was B3 ntr , rounded to the nearest integer. The order of trials was randomly permuted. Subjects
were informed about the set of base rates and that they were equally probable for each block, but they were not informed about
the base rate of each block until the block was completed.
Each trial started with participants fixating a small point (diameter of 0.33 deg visual angle) at the center of the screen. After 0.5 s,
two target arcs (2p=3 radians) of an imaginary circle (radius 10 deg) appeared to the left and right of the fixation point (Figure 1; similar
to Zylberberg et al., 2016). The Subjects had to select the left or right target to indicate leftward or rightward motion, respectively.
Subjects used the upper extreme of targets to indicate full decision confidence (100% certainty that the direction choice was correct)
and the lower extreme to indicate guessing (50% certainty). Intermediate values represent intermediate levels of confidence. As a
visual aid, the targets were colored from green to red from top to bottom (Figure 1).
After a variable duration of 0.3 - 1 s (truncated exponential; t = 0.5 s), the random dot motion was presented in a virtual aperture
centered at fixation and subtending 5 degrees of visual angle. The dot density was 16.7 dots/deg2/s and the displacement of the
coherently moving dots produced an apparent speed of 5 deg/s. In each video frame, a subset of the dots presented 40 ms earlier
were displaced toward the right or left target, depending on the motion direction for that trial. The details of the stimulus generation
process can be found in previous studies (e.g., Roitman and Shadlen, 2002). The probability that a dot moved coherently as opposed
to randomly varied from trial to trial according to the motion strength ðjcjÞ, sampled uniformly from the set [0, 3.2, 6.4, 12.8, 25.6,
51.2]%. To keep the motion strength approximately balanced within each block, we constructed a list of motion coherences by
repeating the six unique coherence values until the first multiple of six that is larger than ntr ; then we shuffled these motion coher-
ences, and assign the first ntr values to the trials in the block. Note that the distribution of motion strengths within a block is indepen-
dent of the base rate.e1 Neuron 99, 1083–1097.e1–e6, September 5, 2018
The random dot motion disappeared after 0.1-0.9 s (truncated exponential, t = 0.6 s), together with the fixation point, and the
participant then reported her decision with a computer mouse. Subjects were free to move the cursor until satisfied with their choice
and confidence report (signaled by pressing the spacebar). As a visual aid, when the cursor approached one of the arcs, amarkerwas
shown on the arc that was closest to the cursor position together with a number between 50 and 100, indicating the probability (as
percentage). See Video S1 for the actual stimulus display.
After the choice and confidence reports aboutmotion direction, subjects reported the degree towhich they considered the block to
be biased in one direction or the other, indicated on a continuous horizontal scale. The leftmost extreme indicated full certainty in a left
bias (belief = 0) and the rightmost extreme indicated full certainty in a right bias (belief = 1). The in-between points represented in-
termediate levels of certainty, with the center of the scale indicating maximal uncertainty, meaning that subjects considered equally
likely that the block was biased in one direction or the other. We used color gradients as a visual aid, with a scale that went fromwhite
to black and then back towhite. Subjects reported their decision bymoving a small triangle to the desired location before pressing the
spacebar to record the belief as the current position of the triangle (see Video S1). For the first trial of a block, the triangle was
rendered at the center. For all subsequent trials it reappeared at the location where it was set in the previous trial. Subjects were
only provided with feedback after a block had been completed. Feedback comprised a single screen indicating whether the block
was biased to the left or to the right, the probability that a trial was biased in this direction (60, 80 or 100%), and the proportion of trials
in the block that the subject reported correctly. An example feedback screen is shown in Figure 1B.
Participants performed the task across multiple sessions (9 to 14, usually 1 session/day). They usually completed 12 blocks per
session. Across days, participants completed 165, 150 and 170 blocks, respectively, for a total of 4564, 4051 and 4554 trials. Before
performing the main experiment, participants were trained to discriminate the direction of random dot motion. During training, the
base rate was fixed and equal to ½. Participants first performed a version of the task in which they were only required to report
the motion direction (436, 432 and 936 trials per participant). During a second stage of training, they also reported their confidence,
using the same numerical scale as in the main experiment (961, 288 and 384 trials per participant).
Model
We used a bounded evidence accumulation model to fit the choices and the confidence about motion direction. In the model, these
reports are based on the state of accumulatedmotion evidence (decision variable, e) at the time ðteÞ that a bound (at ±A) is reached or
when the stimulus ends. The decision variable evolves according to 1-dimensional process of Brownian motion plus deterministic
drift. In small time steps Dt, the state of the decision variable is updated based on the sum of terms representing a deterministic drift
and stochastic diffusion. The drift term is given by kc Dt, where c is the signed motion coherence and k is parameter which deter-
mines the signal-to-noise ratio. The diffusion term follows a normal distribution with a standard deviation of
ffiffiffiffiffi
Dt
p
, such that the vari-
ance at t = 1s (absent bounds) would equal 1. This is not a free parameter, since for any other value we can obtain an equivalent model
by scaling k and A appropriately (Palmer et al., 2005; Shadlen et al., 2006).
The model assumes that the decision maker has access to the state of the decision variable e and the decision time te. In the
Bayesian model, the reports of choice and confidence are based on the posterior probability over motion direction, pðd j eðiÞ; tðiÞe ;
Eði1ÞÞ, and the belief report is based on the posterior probability over base rate, pðB j eðiÞ; tðiÞe ;Eði1ÞÞ. In these expressions, d is the
motion direction, B is the base rate of the block, and i is the trial number. EðiÞ is the tuple of all observations of e and te up to trial i
within a block: Eði1Þhfe; teg1::i1.
The posterior over the two possible directions of motion, pðd j eðiÞ; tðiÞe ;Eði1ÞÞ, can be obtained by Bayes rule:
p

d j eðiÞ; tðiÞe ;Eði1Þ

=
p

eðiÞ; tðiÞe
d;Eði1Þpd jEði1Þ
p

eðiÞ; tðiÞe
Eði1Þ (3)
Which simplifies to:
p

d j eðiÞ; tðiÞe ;Eði1Þ

fp

eðiÞ; tðiÞe
dX
B
pðd jBÞpB jEði1Þ (4)
where the constant of proportionality is such that the sum of the probabilities of right and left equals 1. The sum on the right side of
expression 4 is over the six possible values of B.
The likelihood in expression 4 can be computed by marginalizing over motion coherence (c):
p

eðiÞ; tðiÞe
d=X
c
p

eðiÞ; tðiÞe
 c;dpðc jdÞ (5)
where pðc jdÞ is a uniform distribution over the coherence values that are compatible with motion direction d, and pðeðiÞ; tðiÞe
 c;dÞ is
obtained from the numerical solutions to the Fokker-Planck equation, which governs the bounded drift-diffusion (Kiani and Shad-
len, 2009).
By Bayes rule, the likelihood pðeðiÞ; tðiÞe
dÞ is proportional to the posterior, puðd j eðiÞ; tðiÞe Þ, under a neutral prior. Further, pðd jBÞ is
equal to B if d is rightward, and to ð1 BÞ if d is leftward. These substitutions lead to the expression in Figure 3B.Neuron 99, 1083–1097.e1–e6, September 5, 2018 e2
The choice and the confidence about motion direction are derived from the posterior pðd j eðiÞ;tðiÞe ;Eði1ÞÞ. The decision maker choo-
ses rightward if pðd =R j eðiÞ; tðiÞe ;Eði1ÞÞ> 0:5 and chooses leftward otherwise.
The belief is obtained from the posterior over base rate, pðB j eðiÞ; tðiÞe ;Eði1ÞÞ. By Bayes rule:
where the constant of proportionality is such that X
B
p

B j eðiÞ; tðiÞe ;Eði1Þ

= 1 (7)
and
p

eðiÞ; tðiÞe
B=peðiÞ; tðiÞe RpðR jBÞ|fflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflffl}
B
+p

eðiÞ; tðiÞe
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1B
(8)
The strikethrough in Equation 6 serves as a reminder that Eði1Þ only affects the probability of the evidence throughB. Again, noting
that pðeðiÞ; tðiÞe
dÞ is proportional to the confidence under a neutral prior, puðd j eðiÞ; tðiÞe Þ, we obtain the expression in Figure 3C.
These calculations are iterated for the subsequent trials in the block, where the posterior after one trial becomes the prior for the
next one:
p

B jEðiÞhpB j eðiÞ; tðiÞe ;Eði1Þ (9)
The Bayesian, Choice-only and Choice-confidencemodels differ only on the way in which pðBÞ is updated from one trial to the next
(see Equation 1 of the main text).
Model Fitting
The model was fit to each subject’s choice and confidence report on each trial. Each trial supplies a left or right choice and a con-
fidence rating, which we transformed into a commonmonotonic scale (see below). For fitting, we categorized the confidence ratings
as either high or low. This allowed us to treat each confidence report as a binary variable with likelihood comparable to the choice. For
each subject, the lowest 30% of the confidence reports were considered low confidence. The cutoff seemed sensible given (i) the
way confidence reports cluster in the scale (Figure S2), (ii) that it approximates the proportion of low confidence reports in a similar
task in which subjects categorized confidence into low or high (van den Berg et al., 2016), and (iii) that changing this value within a
reasonable range does not alter the results reported here.
We performed maximum-likelihood fits of the model parameters q separately for each subject:
bq = argmax
q
 XM
j = 1
XNj
i =1
log

p

choice
ðiÞ
j ; conf
ðiÞ
j
 cðiÞj ; T ðiÞj ;Eði1Þj ; q
!
(10)
where Nj is the number of trials in block j, M is the number of blocks, choice and conf are the chosen alternative (left/right) and the
category of the confidence report (high/low) on trial i in block j. Note that information from the previous trials in the block affects the
current one through the distribution over base rate pðB jEði1Þj Þ. The joint distribution over choice and confidence is calculated by
marginalizing over the values of e and te that are consistent with the report. Note for simplicity, from here on, we drop the subscript
notation for the block. For instance, the probability of a rightward choice of low confidence is calculated as:
p

R; low j cðiÞ; T ðiÞ;Eði1Þ; q= ZZ pe; te j cðiÞ; T ðiÞ; q10:5<pðR je;te ;Eði1Þ ;qÞ<fde dte (11)
where 1x is an indicator function that evaluates to 1 when x is true and to zero otherwise, and f is a fitted parameter—a criterion on
probability correct that separates high from low confidence responses. The indicator function restricts the integration to the range of
values of e and te for which the probability of rightward motion is higher that 0.5 but lower than f.
For the first trial in a block, because the subject knows the six possible values that the bias can take and that they are equally likely,
the initial distribution over bias p0ðBÞ should be uniform on these discrete values. However, we assumed that p0ðBÞ could be non-
uniform. The distribution p0ðBÞ is fully specified by two parameters, because there are six possible values that B can take and we
assume that the distribution is symmetric around 0.5. For fitting, theweight of the two values closer to 0.5 was set to 1 (before normal-
izing the probability distribution), and the other twoweights,u1 (for the two intermediate value ofB) andu2 (for the highest and lowest
values of B), were fit to the data. The best-fitting parameters for each subject are shown in Table S2 (see also Figure S6).
To update the probability distribution over B from one trial to the next, we need to know the ratio of the likelihoods pðeðiÞ;
t
ðiÞ
e
RÞ=pðeðiÞ; tðiÞe  LÞ, or equivalently, the ratio of the confidence in rightward and leftward choices under a neutral prior, puðRjeðiÞ;
t
ðiÞ
e Þ=puðLjeðiÞ; tðiÞe Þ. These likelihoods depend on state of accumulated evidence e and the decision time te of each trial, which are
not available to the experimenter. However, we can use Bayes rule to derive the ratio from the transformed confidence reports
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On trials in which subjects chose rightward, confidence is equal to pðR j eðiÞ; tðiÞe ;Eði1ÞÞ which by Bayes rule is:
where the strike-throughmakes explicit supervenience (i.e., given direction, the evidence from previous trials is irrelevant to the likeli-
hood). Similarly,
p

L j eðiÞ; tðiÞe ;Eði1Þ

=
p

eðiÞ; tðiÞe
 LpL jEði1Þ
p

eðiÞ; tðiÞe
Eði1Þ = 1 pR j eðiÞ; tðiÞe ;Eði1Þ (13)
Then the ratio of the likelihoods can be derived from the confidence reported by the subject and the prior expectation over direction
of motion that is updated over trials:
p

eðiÞ; tðiÞe
R
p

eðiÞ; tðiÞe
 L =
 
p

R j eðiÞ; tðiÞe ;Eði1Þ

1 pR j eðiÞ; tðiÞe ;Eði1Þ
!	
1 pR jEði1Þ
pðR jEði1ÞÞ


(14)
Because we cannot assume that the numerical confidence ratings directly reflect the internal estimates of the probability of being
correct, we applied a monotonic transformation to the ratings, which captures their expected distribution under the three models. To
transform the reported confidence into the posterior probability that d is the correct choice, pðd j eðiÞ; tðiÞe ;Eði1ÞÞ, we assumed that
pðd j eðiÞ; tðiÞe ;Eði1ÞÞ is a monotonic but potentially nonlinear function of the reported confidence. We derived this transformation
empirically. Each behavioral trial was assigned a value of probability correct from simulations of the model. The assignment pre-
serves the rank-order of the confidence reports; for instance, the behavioral trial with highest confidence is assigned the highest value
of confidence produced by the model. Note that values of probability correct obtained from simulations of the model depend on the
model parameters. Therefore the transformation of the confidence ratings must be established iteratively duringmodel fitting. Impor-
tantly, the transformation does not affect the high/low designation because it preserves the order of the raw confidence reports. It
does affect the model predictions because it affects counterfactual confidence, hence the update of pðBÞ.
The parameter-free transformation of confidence ratings to probability correct (shown in Figure S7A) ensures that the confidence
distributions of the model and the data are identical. Therefore, we can compare the analog confidence reports between model and
data as a function of the variables of interest: choice accuracy, motion strength, and base rate (Figure S7B). We also used the trans-
formed reports in the Bayesian and Choice-confidence models. The conclusions of our study would not change had we used the raw
confidence reports, although without the transformation the model could not explain the idiosyncrasies in the confidence ratings
(e.g., the over and under confidence displayed by different participants; Figure S7C).
The Bayesian, Choice-only and Choice-confidence models use the same five parameters: k and A (drift-diffusion); f (confidence
binarization); u1 and u2 (initial prior over base rate). We used the Bayesian Adaptive Direct Search (BADS) method to find the
maximum-likelihood parameters (Acerbi and Ma, 2017). We used different initial starting points (N = 30) to reduce the risk of finding
local maxima.
From the best fitting model parameters, we predicted the participants belief reports using the posterior pðB j eðiÞ; tðiÞe ;Eði1ÞÞ. The
belief that the block is biased to the right is given by
beliefh
X
B> 0:5
p

B j eðiÞ; tðiÞe ;Eði1Þ

(15)
In the empirical model (Figure 5D), we parameterized nd (from expression 1) as a logistic function with five parameters:
logit½nd= b0 + b1conf+ b2p

d jEði1Þ+ b3pd jEði1Þconf+ b4 confpðd jEði1ÞÞ (16)
where ’conf’ is the transformed confidence. The b are fit simultaneously with the other 5 parameters of the model. The mapping from
confidence and motion expectation to nd for the best-fitting model is shown in Figure 5D. Similar results were obtained using the raw
confidence ratings instead of the transformed confidence in Equation 16.
The model predictions displayed in Figures 4, 6, 7, and 8 were obtained from simulations using the fitted parameters. Predictions
are based on 200 simulations of the full experiment, using the same sequence of trials (motion strength, direction, and duration) as
those performed by the participants. To produce the smooth lines in Figure 4 at interpolated values, we simulated each trial repeat-
edly with a fine grid of motion strengths (Figures 4A and 4D), and stimulus durations (Figures 4B and 4E). Each interpolated point
requires simulation of the entire experiment.
We considered two models to explain the apparent lag between reported belief and model predictions, evident in Figure 6B. In the
first, the lag only affects the expression of the report, analogous to capacitor charge, in accordance with the difference equation,
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where fi is the belief reported on trial i and bi is the belief that would have been reported if there were no lag in the belief reports
(Equation 2). The time constant, a, was fit to minimize the mean-squared error between model and data (Figure 8B).
We also explored an alternative non-Bayesianmodel in which the lag affects the update of pðBÞ, and thus choice and confidence. In
this alternativemodel the distributions over base rate for trial i, piðBÞ, is a weighted average of the distribution over base rates from the
previous trial, pi1ðBÞ, and the distribution that would result if pðBÞ were updated in a Bayesian manner, pbi ðBÞ,
piðBÞ=pi1ðBÞ+

pbi ðBÞ  pi1ðBÞ
ð1 aÞ (18)
We fit this model to the choice and confidence data, refitting all parameters of the Bayesian model plus the a parameter. We also
use this alternative implementation of lag in the Choice-only and Choice-confidence models, replacing pbðBÞ in Equation 18 by the
value of pðBÞ of the matching model without lag.
Data Analysis
We used linear and logistic regression models to evaluate the influence of the base rate, motion strength, and viewing duration, on
choice, confidence, and belief. We used t tests (using the parameter estimates and its standard error) to evaluate the null hypothesis
that a single coefficient of a linear regression model is zero. For logistic regression models, we used likelihood-ratio tests for nested
models to evaluate the null hypothesis that one or more of the regression coefficients were equal to zero. Unless otherwise indicated,
we incorporated data from the three participants in all regression models using indicator variables.
The logistic regression model used to examine the effect of base rate on choice (solid lines of Figure 2A) is:
logit½p+ = b1Tc+
XnB
i = 1

b2;ic+ b3;i

IBi +
XnS1
j = 1
b4;j ISj (19)
where p+ is the probability of a rightward choice, c is the motion coherence and T is the stimulus duration. The subscripted indicator
variables I are over base rateB and subject S. For instance, IBi is equal to 1 for trials from blocks with base rateBi, and zero otherwise.
The second subscripts of the b parameters indicate separate parameters fit over the indexed categorical variables. nB and nS are the
number of unique base rates and the number of subjects respectively. Note that the b4 coefficient associated with the last subject is
omitted from the equation to avoid redundant parameterization (singular design matrix). The inset in Figure 2A shows the b3;i coef-
ficients and associated standard errors obtained from the logistic fits using combined data from all subjects.
To examine the influence of base rate and motion strength on confidence, we used the following linear regression model, fit using
correct decisions only:
conf= b1jcj + b2Bsr + b3h+
XnS
i = 1
b4;i ISi (20)
where conf is the confidence report (0.5-1 scale), Bsr is the base rate relative to the choice (B for rightward and 1 B for leftward
choices), and h is the choice (left or right) to account for potential differences in confidence due to chosen side.
The regressionmodel used to evaluate howaccuracy depends onmotion strength, motion viewing duration, trial number, and base
rate (Figure 4C) is:
logit½pc= b1jcj + b2T +
XnS1
i = 1
b3;i ISi +
XnS
j =1
b4;jjcj ISj +
Xntr
k = 1

b5;k + b6;kBs

INk (21)
where pc is the probability of a correct response, N is the trial number, ntr is the maximum number of trials in a block and Bs is the
informativeness of the base rate (i.e., either 0.6, 0.8, or 1). Figure 4C (top) shows the b6 coefficients.
A similar logistic regression model was fit to confidence (Figure 4F):
logit½ph= b1jcj + b2T + b3h+ b4a+
XnS1
i = 1

b5;i + b6;i
c ISi +XnS
j = 1

b7;j
c aISj +Xntr
k = 1

b8;k + b9;kBsr

INk (22)
where ph is the probability of a high-confidence report, h is the choice (left or right) to account for potential differences in confidence
due to chosen side, and a is the accuracy of the response (0 or 1 for incorrect and correct decisions respectively). Figure 4F (bottom)
shows the b9 coefficients. The extra terms are included as potential confounders.
The same regressions were used for both data and model in Figures 4C and 4F. For the model, we conducted the logistic regres-
sions independently for 200 simulations the model and then averaged the regression coefficients. The standard errors (gray shading)
are the standard deviation of the coefficients from the 200 simulations. The model was evaluated on the same sequence of trials as
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To test the influence of motion strength on DBelief (Figure S5), we fit the following linear regression model:
DBelief= b1jcj + b2T + b3Beliefc +
XnS
i = 1
b4;i ISi (23)
where DBelief is the difference between the belief reported in the current trial and the belief reported in the previous trial (or the dif-
ference from ½ for the first trial of the block). To simplify the regression model, DBelief was multiplied by 1 when the subject chose
the leftward direction of motion. Therefore a positive DBelief indicates a change in the direction of the choice. Accordingly, Beliefc is
the belief in the current trial (see Figure 6) relative to the actual choice (i.e., Beliefc is equal to the reported belief for rightward choices,
and to one minus the reported belief for leftward choices). As in Figure S5, only correct trials were used for the regression model.
We used the following logistic regressionmodel to test the influence of the block’s base rate on the choices for 0%coherence trials:
logit½pconsistent= b1Bs + b2T +
XnS
i = 1
b3;i ISi (24)
where pconsistent is the probability that the choice is made in the direction consideredmost likely by the subject, that is, consistent with
the belief reported on the previous trial. In the regression analysis we only included trials of 0%motion strength and those in which the
belief in the previous trial was either lower than 0.05 or higher than 0.95.
In the analysis of Figure 8, we used the MSE between the reported belief and the model prediction to compare the goodness-of-fit
of the models with and without lag. We evaluated the significance of the difference in the MSE by simulating each model 200 times,
and defining the p value as the proportion of times in which the model with lag had a lower MSE than the Bayesian model.
DATA AND SOFTWARE AVAILABILITY
Data and code are available at https://github.com/arielzylberberg. Behavioral data is also available at https://dx.doi.org/10.17632/
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